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The paper presents a model that allows a unified analysis of sickness absence and search 
unemployment. Sickness appears as random shocks to individual utility functions, interacts 
with individual searchand labor supply decisions and triggers movements across labor force 
states. The employed worker prefers absence for sufficiently severe sickness and the 
unemployed worker may prefer nonparticipation if the disutility of search is amplified by 
sickness. The decisions governing labor force transitions are influenced by social insurance 
benefits available for sick or unemployed workers. We examine how these benefits affect 
individual decisions on absence and search and the implications for employment, 
unemployment and nonparticipation. The normative analysis of the socially optimal benefit 
structure suggests that there is, in general, a case for benefit di.erentiation across states of 
non-work. In particular, there is a case for a benefit structure that rewards active job search. 
JEL Classification: J21, J64, J65. 
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 1 Introduction
Sickness absence represents a considerable loss of work-time, often of the
same order of magnitude as the loss associated with unemployment. Some
forms of sickness absence are clearly involuntary from the worker’s perspec-
tive, such as absence caused by severe accidents or diseases. Other forms of
sickness absence are best described as voluntary adjustments to changes in
preferences for leisure or the value of home production. When contractual
work hours are rigid, absence from work becomes the obvious adjustment
margin. The borderline between voluntary and involuntary sickness absence
is fuzzy, however, and it is probably not very meaningful to delve into where
t h i sl i n ee x a c t l ys h o u l db ed r a w n .B et h a ta si tm a y ,i ti sc l e a rf r o mag r o w -
ing number of empirical studies that economic incentives matter for sickness
absence: the lower the cost of missing work, the more likely that the worker
is on sick leave.
Sickness, be it serious or trivial, is of course not something that exclusively
hits employed workers. Unemployed individuals as well as nonparticipants
are also prone to random changes in health or preferences for leisure. This
raises intriguing issues for public social insurance policies. What are the labor
market eﬀects of changes in sickness and unemployment beneﬁts and what
i st h eb e s tb e n e ﬁt structure from a welfare perspective? These are the issues
analyzed in this paper. The purpose is to develop a framework suitable to
analyze sickness absence as well as unemployment in a coherent and uniﬁed
fashion.
The reason for proposing a uniﬁed analysis of sickness absence and unem-
ployment is the recognition of potentially important interdependencies be-
tween social insurance policies in the two areas. Sickness beneﬁts may aﬀect
the rewards from employment relative to unemployment and thus inﬂuence
individual transitions between those labor force states. Unemployment bene-
ﬁts will also inﬂuence the relative rewards of employment and unemployment
and this may in turn aﬀect the employed worker’s absence behavior if the
risk of job loss depends on absence status. Moreover, it is likely that the un-
employed worker’s incentives to engage in active job search is aﬀected by the
2economic consequences he would face if he decided to report sick and unable
to meet the search requirements for unemployment beneﬁt receipt. Indeed,
policy discussions in several countries, including Sweden and the Nether-
lands, have emphasized that the ﬂows between unemployment and reported
sickness may be quantitatively important and ﬁscally costly.
Although government social insurance policies concerning sickness and
unemployment diﬀer across countries, there are some common characteris-
tics. Almost all developed countries have public unemployment insurance
systems where beneﬁt levels (or replacement rates) are regulated by govern-
ment policies. Sickness insurance is also generally subject to government
regulations, albeit with substantial diﬀerences across countries. The paper
focuses on a stylized system where the government has three policy instru-
ments at its disposal, viz. sickness beneﬁts available for employed workers on
sick leave, unemployment beneﬁts targeted at nonemployed job searchers, and
sickness assistance intended for nonemployed individuals who report sick.
We consider an economy where chance and choice trigger individual tran-
sitions between labor market states. Chance appears as exogenous shocks to
health (sickness) as well as job ﬁndings and job separations. Choice enters
in the form of individual dichotomous decisions on whether to work or not
(if the individual is employed) and whether to search or not (if the individ-
ual is nonemployed). Sickness strikes as stochastic shocks to the individual’s
utility function and aﬀects the disutility of work as well as the disutility of
job search. New realizations of sickness induce the individual to consider
whether or not a transition to a new labor market state is optimal. For ex-
ample, a person who is currently working may ﬁnd it optimal to call in sick
for suﬃciently adverse shocks. Sickness thus interacts with the worker’s la-
bor supply decision and also with the nonemployed worker’s search decision;
a person searching for work may prefer not to search if the cost of searching
is ampliﬁed by illness.
The analysis begins by considering individual optimization and proceeds
to a characterization of a steady state labor market equilibrium where in-
dividuals are allocated across four diﬀerent states: work, sick leave, unem-
ployment and nonparticipation. Individuals at work or on sick leave are
3referred to as employed; individuals that are unemployed or nonparticipants
are nonemployed.1 The key diﬀerence between unemployment and nonpar-
ticipation is that the probability of job ﬁnding is higher when unemployed.
This distinction is in line with the usual deﬁnitions in labor force surveys
where some search eﬀort is a prerequisite for being classiﬁed as unemployed.
It is also in line with empirical results showing higher job ﬁnding rates from
unemployment than from nonparticipation (cf. Flinn and Heckman, 1983).
Section 2 of the paper gives some basic facts about sickness absence, poli-
cies concerning sickness absence and related literature. Section 3 presents the
model and derives a number of comparative statics predictions regarding the
eﬀects of non-work beneﬁts. These predictions concern individual decisions
on sickness reporting and search as well as aggregate labor market outcomes.
The analysis veriﬁes policy interdependencies of the form alluded to in the
discussion above; policies targeted at the unemployed aﬀect sickness behavior
among the employed and vice versa. For example, higher sickness beneﬁts
for employees will unambiguously increase unemployment although it may
also increase total employment. Higher unemployment beneﬁts will increase
the fraction of employees on sick leave whereas the eﬀect on the total number
of sick absentees is ambiguous. The precise eﬀects often depend on whether
or not absence is associated with an excess risk of job loss.
Section 4 turns to a normative analysis of the socially optimal beneﬁt
structure. With risk-averse individuals, there is a case for insurance against
income loss but the optimal level of beneﬁts may conceivably diﬀer depend-
ing on which labor force state that is occupied. In general, the optimal
policy involves beneﬁtd i ﬀerentiation across states of non-work since the be-
havioral responses depend on the type of beneﬁtc h a n g et h a ti sc o n s i d e r e d . 2
To the extent that job search can be monitored, there is a case for rewarding
active search; unemployment beneﬁts should then be higher than sickness
assistance.
1We refer to all individuals as ‘workers’, irrespective of their labor market states. Since
all individuals are ex ante identical, they are all potential workers.
2This claim contrasts with a common proposal to equalize beneﬁts across states of
non-work (see e.g. Lindbeck et al, 1994).
42 Sickness Absence: Facts and Findings
2.1 Sickness Absence
Sickness absence among employees varies substantially across countries. Data
from European labor force surveys show that absence rates around the turn
of the century were particularly high in Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands
(Nyman et al, 2002). In those countries, around 4 percent of the employed
workers reported sickness absence exceeding one week. These numbers were
about twice as high as absence rates in several other European countries. The
international comparison in Barmby et al (2002) showed that absence hours
relative to contractual hours hovered between 2 and 6 percent during the
1990s. Data from Statistics Norway show that Norwegian sickness absence
over the period 2000-2003 has reached 7-8 percent of contractual hours.
The prevalence of sickness reporting among unemployed individuals is
less well documented in the data. There is some Swedish evidence that
there is an overrepresentation of unemployed individuals among recipients of
sickness insurance beneﬁts. Larsson (2004) documents that the probability of
reporting sick is substantially higher among unemployed insured individuals
than among insured individuals in general. Moreover, the duration of sickness
beneﬁt receipt appears to be signiﬁcantly longer among the unemployed than
among employees, even after controls for a number of personal characteristics
(Riksförsäkringsverket, 2003).
Data on the duration of sickness spells are rarely available in a way that
permits systematic comparisons over time or across countries. Swedish data
indicate that the overwhelming majority of sickness spells are of short dura-
tion. In 1991, around 60 percent of the spells lasted three days or less and
80 percent lasted ﬁve days or less. Only 9 percent of the spells lasted more
than two weeks. Survey data from recent years conﬁrm that this pattern
still holds. The picture looks very diﬀerent, however, if one looks at spells in
progress as opposed to all (completed) spells. In December 1991, around 77
percent of spells in progress had lasted 30 days or more whereas the fraction
5of long spells (30 days or more) accounted for only 5 percent of the ﬂow.3
Most new spells of sickness thus last for just a few days but long-term sick-
ness accounts for a substantial fraction of total sickness absence observed at
ap o i n ti nt i m e .
2.2 Sickness Insurance
The ﬁrst forms of sickness insurance were organized by voluntary organiza-
tions, including trade unions. Compulsory sickness insurance was instituted
in most OECD countries during the 20th century; see Kangas (1991) for
an overview. These systems vary substantially along a number of dimen-
sions such as length of waiting period (if any) before compensation is paid
out, statutory replacement rates, caps on beneﬁts levels, time limits, re-
quirements concerning medical certiﬁcation, the extent of employer-provided
sick-pay, the prevalence of collective agreements on sickness beneﬁts, and the
treatment of unemployed individuals.4 Suﬃce it here to note that replace-
ment rates in sickness insurance typically diﬀer between employed and un-
employed individuals. Sickness beneﬁts for employees often replace a (very)
high fraction of income, sometimes even 100 percent if supplementary ne-
gotiated beneﬁts are included. Sickness beneﬁts available for unemployed
persons are typically lower, often coinciding with the beneﬁtl e v e l sp r o v i d e d
by unemployment insurance.5
Real-world sickness insurance schemes involve various measures to miti-
gate moral hazard problems. Rules concerning medical certiﬁcation as well
3The introduction (in 1992) of employer-provided sick pay for the ﬁrst weeks of sickness
has made it diﬃcult to obtain consistent Swedish time series on sickness absence and its
duration structure. The ﬁgures reported in the text are obtained from the National Social
Insurance Board.
4Two useful sources of information are Werkdocument No 286 from the Dutch Ministry
of Social Aﬀairs and Employment and RFV ANALYSERAR 2003:16 from the (Swedish)
National Social Insurance Board.
5There are also examples of systems where compensation from sickness insurance avail-
able for the unemployed is higher than compensation from unemployment insurance. This
was true for Sweden before 1 July 2003, albeit only for workers with above-average earn-
ings. See Larsson (2002).
6as monitoring by employers and/or insurance providers are obvious ways to
prevent excessive use of sickness insurance when replacement rates are high.
However, since sickness to a large extent is private information to the individ-
ual worker, there is little doubt that the individual has considerable inﬂuence
over his absence decisions.
2.3 Related Literature
Research by economists on sickness absence has almost exclusively been em-
pirical. Brown and Sessions (1996) provide a recent survey of the literature.
There is an increasing amount of evidence that economic incentives matter
for absence behavior; the lower the cost of missing work, the more likely that
the worker is on sick leave. This strand of empirical literature includes pa-
pers by Allen (1981), Barmby et al (1991), Broström et al (2004), Johansson
and Palme (1996, 2002), Henrekson and Persson (2004) and others.
The incentive system pertaining to sickness absence may also depend
on employment protection legislation. Ichino and Riphahn (2003, 2004) ar-
gue that stringent employment protection may induce higher absenteeism
by reducing the risk of being ﬁred due to absence from work. Indeed, their
empirical case studies based on data from Germany and Italy support their
hypotheses.
Data from some countries, such as Norway and Sweden, suggest that sick-
ness absence is strongly pro-cyclical. The precise reasons for this pattern are
not well understood, however. One hypothesis emphasizes behavioral eﬀects,
arguing that workers fear job loss more when labor markets are slack and
that they perceive sickness absence to be associated with higher risk of job
loss. Another hypothesis emphasizes selection eﬀects; the tighter the labor
market, the higher the fraction of relatively more sickness-prone workers in
the labor force. The relative importance of behavioral and selection eﬀects
remains an open issue. Several recent studies have provided evidence con-
ﬁrming behavioral eﬀects (Hesselius, 2003; Askildsen et al, 2002; and Arai
and Skogman Thoursie, 2001).
Theoretical work on sickness absence is relatively rare. The survey by
7Brown and Sessions (1996) discusses mainly some versions of the static neo-
classical labor supply model. Other authors have emphasized labor demand
considerations; Ehrenberg (1970) is a seminal paper in this regard. More
recent contributions include, among others, Barmby et al (1994) who propose
an eﬃciency wage model where ﬁrms use wage adjustment as a means to
inﬂuence absence.
The present paper ignores ﬁrm behavior and focuses on the supply side.
The approach is akin to a class of multistate models of labor force dynamics
where Toikka (1976) is a seminal paper and other contributions include Flinn
and Heckman (1982) as well as Burdett et al (1984). These papers consider
individual search and labor supply decisions in stochastic environments, al-
lowing for nonparticipation as a distinct state in addition to employment and
unemployment. The value of nonmarket activity is taken as a random vari-
able and individuals choose nonparticipation for suﬃciently favorable realiza-
tions of nonmarket productivity. The more recent contribution by Garibaldi
and Wasmer (2001) takes this approach one step further by incorporating
endogenous wage determination.
It lies close at hand to incorporate sickness into nonparticipation; indeed,
this seems to be the view taken in some of the earlier papers. The drawback
of this approach is that it provides a highly inaccurate picture of sickness
absence among employees. A nonparticipant contemplating labor market
entry must compare the beneﬁts of entry to the costs of search, recognizing
that job oﬀers are random rather than certain. By contrast, an employed
worker on sick leave faces no search costs (unless he contemplates quitting to
a new employer) and the consequences of returning to work are predictable.
It is diﬃcult to imagine how one could analyze sickness absence policies
without explicit treatment of sickness absence as a distinct labor force state.
This paper focuses almost exclusively on the eﬀects of non-work beneﬁts.
However, the framework can also be used to shed light on other issues, such as
how labor market conditions and employment protection rules aﬀect sickness
absence. In fact, the analysis of non-work beneﬁts reveals that employment
protection rules may have important consequences for how beneﬁts aﬀect
labor market outcomes.
83T h e M o d e l
3.1 Overview
We start by a brief overview of the basic framework. There is a ﬁxed number
of individuals who can occupy one of four mutually exclusive states, viz.
work, sickness absence, unemployment and nonparticipation. Work and sick
leave represent employment, whereas unemployment and nonparticipation
represent nonemployment. Each state is associated with a particular present
discounted value of future income (utility). This value depends on income in
the current state as well as incomes in all other potential states since choice
and chance induce movements across states.
Employed workers are subject to a risk of job loss that may or may not
diﬀer between individuals at work and workers on sick leave. In general,
there is a presumption that absence is associated with an excess layoﬀ (or
ﬁring) risk. The state-speciﬁc ﬁring risks are exogenous to the worker but
the expected ﬁring probability is endogenous as a result of the worker’s ab-
sence decision. The expected ﬁring probability corresponds to the fraction
of employed workers that enter nonemployment in each period.
The probability that a nonemployed worker ﬁnds a job is higher if he
actively searches as unemployed than if he rejects search and prefers non-
participation. These state-speciﬁcj o bﬁnding (hiring) probabilities are ex-
ogenous to the worker but the expected job ﬁnding probability is endogenous
as a result of the worker’s decision whether to search or not to search. The
expected hiring probability corresponds to the fraction of nonemployed indi-
viduals hired in every period.
Individuals are exposed to random sickness shocks that aﬀect the disutil-
ity of work and search. Optimal behavior is characterized by cut-oﬀ values
for sickness. The employed worker prefers absence rather than work for
suﬃciently severe sickness; analogously, the nonemployed individual prefers
nonparticipation to costly search for suﬃciently severe realizations of sick-
ness. These reservation values of sickness generally diﬀer between employed
and nonemployed individuals and depend on beneﬁts and other parameters
9of the model.
To sketch the workings of the model, consider a rise in sickness beneﬁts
for employed workers. This makes the employed worker more prone to choose
absence and causes an increase in the sickness absence rate, i.e., the fraction
of employees on sick leave. However, there will also be eﬀects on hirings and
ﬁrings. Higher sickness beneﬁts raise the value of employment relative to
unemployment and makes the nonemployed worker more inclined to engage
in active search. The expected hiring rate increases which in turns tends to
increase employment. Higher sickness beneﬁts will also increase the expected
ﬁring rate if absence is associated with an excess ﬁring risk; this tends to
reduce employment.
Consider as a second example the implications of higher unemployment
beneﬁts. This experiment presupposes that it is possible to target beneﬁts
at those engaged in active search. Higher unemployment beneﬁts encourage
search among the nonemployed and this raises the expected hiring rate. Both
unemployment and employment tend to increase. Higher unemployment ben-
eﬁts may however also make the employed worker more absence-prone since
the costs of job loss have fallen; this raises the expected ﬁring rate and the
outﬂow from employment to nonemployment.
The ﬁrms’ decisions aﬀect the probability of job loss as well as the prob-
ability of job ﬁnding but these decisions are taken as exogenous. We conﬁne
the analysis to individual adjustments along the extensive margins: the em-
ployed worker chooses between work and absence, the nonemployed between
search as unemployed and nonparticipation without search. A richer analysis
would incorporate the intensive margins (hours of work and hours of search)
but the mechanisms identiﬁed by the simpler approach would still be present.
3.2 Individual Preferences
The number of individuals is normalized to unity. Individuals are all ho-
mogenous ex ante, i.e., before they have been allocated to a particular labor
market state and before they have been hit by shocks to their utility func-
tions. As already stated, there are four potential states (j), viz. work (w),
10sickness absence (or sick leave, s), unemployment (u), and nonparticipation
(n). As in conventional labor force surveys, work and sick leave represent
employment, whereas unemployment and nonparticipation are referred to as
nonemployment.





where Cj is consumption, aj a positive parameter, and θ a stochastic utility
shifter that is increasing in sickness.6 Successive θ are independently and
identically distributed random variables drawn from a known distribution
F(θ) with support [0,K] and density f(θ). Consumption is equal to after-
tax income in every period. Consumption while at work (wage income) is
given as Cw = Y ; work-hours are taken as ﬁxed so Y is a constant. The
individual is entitled to non-work beneﬁts when he does not work; the levels
of these beneﬁts may diﬀer across the three states of non-work. An employed
worker who is absent from work receives sickness beneﬁts (sickpay), Cs =
Bs; an unemployed person receives unemployment beneﬁts, Cu = Bu;a n d
nonparticipants may receive what is referred to as sickness assistance, Cn =
Bn Lower-case letters denote the natural logarithms of (after-tax) incomes
in the four states, i.e., y =l nY and bj =l nBj.
The feasibility of diﬀerentiating between unemployment beneﬁts to the
unemployed and sickness assistance to nonparticipants depends on whether
or not search eﬀort can be monitored by government policy. Imperfect mon-
itoring of search behavior among beneﬁt recipients is a typical feature of
existing unemployment insurance schemes. We do not introduce an explicit
model of monitoring (as in Boone et al, 2002), but conﬁne the analysis to two
polar cases: the government can either perfectly monitor search or it cannot
monitor search at all. Beneﬁtd i ﬀerentiation between the unemployed and
the nonparticipants is feasible in the ﬁrst case but impossible in the second
case.
6The comparative statics results are identical for a utility function that is linear in
consumption/income. The normative analysis of optimal insurance requires risk aversion,
however.
11The parameter aj is normalized to unity for “inactive” individuals, i.e.,
the sickness absentees and the nonparticipants. For individuals at work and
for those who are unemployed, aj is assumed to be greater than unity. That
is, aj =1for j = s,n,a n daj > 1 for j = w,u.F r o m n o w o n w e d r o p
the superscript and take a as strictly greater than one, i.e., a>1.T h e
assumptions concerning a capture the idea that the disutility of work or
search is increasing in sickness.7
3.3 Value Functions and Decision Rules
The model is set in discrete time where future sickness status is uncertain.
Tomorrow is another day and each morning involves a draw from F(θ).I f
t h ew o r k e ri se m p l o y e dt h e r ei ss o m er i s ko fj o bl o s sa n di ft h ew o r k e ri s
nonemployed there is some chance of job ﬁnding. The probability of job
loss may diﬀer between workers at work and workers on sick leave. Let φ
w
denote the job loss probability for a person at work and φ
s the corresponding
probability for a person on sick leave. Assume that work can never be more
risky than sick leave, i.e., φ
w ≤ φ
s. A natural benchmark case involves
equal separation risks, φ
w = φ
s = φ, which may correspond to a stringent
employment protection legislation. The probability of job ﬁnding is denoted
αu if the individual is unemployed (searching) and as αn if the individual
is not participating in the labor force (not searching). We assume αu >α n
where αn ≥ 0.8
The parameters of the model are such that employment is always pre-
ferred to nonemployment, a viability condition that puts restrictions on the
transition probabilities and the beneﬁt structure. Job oﬀers are thus always
accepted by nonemployed individuals. The key decision for an employed
worker is whether to choose work or sick leave. The analogous decision for
a nonemployed worker is whether to search or not to search, i.e., whether to
7To illustrate the general idea, suppose that the utility function takes the form υj =
lnCj − (1 + Ij)θ,w h e r eIj represents eﬀort devoted to work or to search. We then have
Ij =0( a =1 )for j = s, n and Ij > 0( a>1) for j = w, u.
8Job ﬁnding without search (αn > 0) is possible because employers may initiate con-
tacts with workers.
12choose unemployment or nonparticipation.
With these assumptions we are ready to consider the value functions.
Let W(θ) denote the expected present value of being at work, S(θ) the value
of being on sick leave, U(θ) the value of being unemployed, and N(θ) the
value of being a nonparticipant. These present values are computed after
a particular realization of θ and involves optimal behavior with respect to
future shocks. The value functions are written as follows:



















































The present value of being employed and working involves a ﬂow return
given by y − aθ as well as changes in utility caused by sickness and labor
market shocks. The probability of job loss is φ
w and the probability of
retaining the job is 1 − φ
w. If the worker is laid oﬀ he decides whether to
choose unemployment or nonparticipation, i.e., he takes max[U(x),N(x)].I f
the job is retained the choice is between work and sick leave and the worker
13thus takes max[W(x),S(x)]. End-of-period discounting is applied at the rate
r>0. Analogous interpretations hold for the other value functions.
The decision rules are such that suﬃciently serious sickness makes the
worker more inclined to prefer inactivity to activity, i.e., sick-leave is pre-
ferred to work and nonparticipation is preferred to unemployment. Consider
an individual at work who observes a new value of θ and decides to remain
at work as long as θ does not exceed a critical value, Q.T h a t i s , w o r k i s
chosen for θ ≤ Q and sickness absence for θ>Q . Analogous rules apply
to nonemployed individuals. Let R denote the critical value of sickness for
a nonemployed person. Search unemployment is chosen for θ ≤ R and non-
participation for θ>R . A reservation sickness strategy is optimal for the
employed worker when W(θ) ≥ S(θ) for θ ≤ Q,a n dW(θ) <S (θ) for θ>Q .









w h i c hg u a r a n t e e st h eo p t i m a l i t yo ft h er e s e r v a t i o ns i c k n e s sr u l es i n c ea>1.
For a nonemployed person, the optimality of the reservation sickness rule
requires that U(θ) ≥ N(θ) for θ ≤ R,a n dU(θ) <N(θ) for θ>R . U(·) and









so the inequality U0(θ) <N 0(θ) obviously holds. The value functions are
illustrated in Figure 1.
Given the existence of unique reservation values, the probability of re-
porting sick is 1 − F(Q) if the worker is employed and 1 − F(R) if he is
nonemployed. The probability of reporting sick is obviously decreasing in
the reservation values.
The reservation sickness conditions imply that we can deﬁne the following

















where Me pertains to employment (work and sick leave) and Mo to non-
employment (unemployment and nonparticipation). Me and Mo are ex ante
expected present values of employment and nonemployment in the sense that
they correspond to present values before the veil of ignorance concerning θ
is lifted, given that optimal decision rules are followed in the future. By
virtue of individual optimization, these values are (locally) independent of







as is clear from diﬀerentiation of (6) and (7) and evaluating at Q and R,
respectively.
The reservation sickness conditions can now be computed by imposing
the indiﬀerence condition W(Q)=S(Q) for the employed worker and the
analogous condition U(R)=N(R) for a worker who is not employed:
Q =






bu − bn +( αu − αn)(Me − Mo)
a − 1
(9)
T h e s ee x p r e s s i o n sc a na l s ob ew r i t t e na s
b
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where the left-hand sides capture the immediate gain of choosing sick leave
relative to work, or nonparticipation relative to search, and the right-hand
sides represent the associated costs. The costs are in terms of foregone em-
ployment opportunities; the employed worker may run an excess risk of being
ﬁred when choosing sick leave and the nonemployed worker will be less likely
to ﬁnd a job when choosing not to search. The gains and costs are equal at










Figure 1: Value functions.
The reservation values are determined by four factors. First, the ﬂow
utility diﬀerence between activity and inactivity clearly matters; the relevant
variable is y − bs for the employed worker and bu − bn for a worker who is
not employed. The higher the relative gain of being active, the higher the
reservation value (and the lower the probability of reporting sick). Diﬀerences
in transition probabilities also matter, i.e., φ
s − φ
w for the employed worker
and αu − αn for a nonemployed worker. The higher the excess ﬁring risk
associated with absence, the lower the probability of sickness absence. And
the higher the relative returns to active search, the lower the probability
that a nonemployed worker reports sick. A third factor is the diﬀerence
between the values of being employed and nonemployed in the future, i.e.,
Me − Mo. Finally and trivially, the disutility of work and search, captured
by the parameter a,m a t t e r s .
An equilibrium satisfying the viability constraint Me − Mo ≥ 0 may
imply Q>R(as illustrated in Figure 1) but does not rule out Q ≤ R.
N o t ef r o m( 8 )t h a tp o s i t i v ew o r ka t t e n d a n c e,F(Q) > 0,r e q u i r e sy>b s
if there is no excess ﬁring risk associated with sickness absence (φ
s = φ
w).
16The maximum values of employment and unemployment are functions of all
parameters of the problem. This generally implies that variables speciﬁct o
nonemployment, such as unemployment beneﬁts and job oﬀer probabilities,
will aﬀect absence decisions also among employed workers (except when φ
w =
φ
s). Analogously, variables speciﬁct oe m p l o y m e n ta ﬀect search decisions
among the nonemployed. Changes in beneﬁts will have direct eﬀects — given
Me and Mo —a sw e l la si n d i r e c te ﬀects operating via changes in Me and Mo.
3.4 Comparative Statics
3.4.1 Preliminaries
It will be convenient to combine eqs. (2)-(7) and write the maximum value
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where Γe(Me,Mo;·) is the right-hand side of (10) and Γo(Me,Mo;·) is the
right-hand side of (11). Eqs. (8), (9), (12) and (13) determine Q, R, Me
and Mo as functions of the parameters of the problem. Since Me and Mo
are invariant to derivative changes of Q and R we can focus on eqs. (12) and
(13) when examining the determinants of Me and Mo.D i ﬀerentiation of (12)
and (13) yields a determinant of the form H ≡ r
³




17where ˜ α ≡ αuF(R)+αn (1 − F(R)) is the expected hiring rate and ˜ φ ≡
φ
wF(Q)+φ
s(1 − F(Q)) the expected ﬁring rate.












where ˜ υe(·) is the expected per-period utility if employed and ˜ υo(·) the ex-
pected per-period utility if nonemployed. In particular,
˜ υ
e ≡ F(Q)[y − E(θ | θ ≤ Q]+( 1− F(Q))[b
s − E(θ | θ>Q ] (16)
˜ υ
o ≡ F(R)[b
u − E(θ | θ ≤ R]+( 1− F(R))[b
n − E(θ | θ>R ] (17)
where E stands for the expectations operator.
3.4.2 Non-work Beneﬁts, Absence and Search
Consider how changes in non-work beneﬁts aﬀect reservation values of sick-
ness while employed (Q) and nonemployed (R). Remember that the decision
on Q entails a decision on absence when employed whereas the decision on R
implies a decision whether or not to engage in job search. The government’s
budget restriction is ignored in this exercise; in fact, under the assumptions
that we will subsequently introduce, taxes do not inﬂuence the choice of
reservation values.
As noted, the eﬀects of interest have two components, namely direct “M-
constant” eﬀects as well as indirect “M-variable” eﬀects. Sickness beneﬁts
while employed (bs)a ﬀect R only indirectly; analogously, unemployment ben-
eﬁts (bu) and sickness assistance (bn)a ﬀect Q only indirectly. The three cases














































The ﬁrst terms are obtained from partial diﬀerentiation of the right-hand
sides of (8) and (9) with respect to bj and can be thought of as a substi-
tution eﬀect. It can be produced by a change in beneﬁts accompanied by
compensating income variations to employed and nonemployed workers so as
to keep both Me and Mo constant (or the diﬀerence between the two). The
substitution eﬀect captures the immediate incentive to prefer a state that
has become more attractive.
The M-adjustments can be thought of as wealth changes arising from
beneﬁt increases. As is clear from (18), the bigger a positive impact of
sickness beneﬁts on the diﬀerence between Me and Mo, the less likely that
absence increases. This wealth eﬀect on Q vanishes when separation risks are
equal. Analogously, what matters for search decisions is the relative impact
on Me and Mo.T h eb i g g e rt h ei m p a c to nMe, the more likely that the worker
chooses search (“high” R) since active search increases the probability of job
ﬁnding.
Straightforward calculations yield the following eﬀects on Me − Mo:
∂ (Me − Mo)
∂bs =
1 − F(Q)
˜ α + ˜ φ + r
> 0 (21)
∂ (Me − Mo)
∂bu = −
F(R)
˜ α + ˜ φ + r
< 0 (22)
∂ (Me − Mo)
∂bn = −
1 − F(R)
˜ α + ˜ φ + r
< 0 (23)
Higher sick pay to an employed worker is of immediate value to such
an individual but of only future value to a nonemployed individual. Hence
19∂ (Me − Mo)/∂bs > 0. Analogously, higher unemployment beneﬁts or sick-
ness assistance are of immediate value only for the nonemployed which ex-
plains the negative signs in (22) and (23).9
The comparative statics results concerning Q and R are displayed in
Table 1. We also include the eﬀect on the expected hiring probability, ˜ α,
and the expected ﬁring probability, ˜ φ;n o t et h a tt h ef o r m e ri sr i s i n gi nR,
d˜ α/dR =( αu − αn)f(R) > 0, whereas the latter is nonincreasing in Q,
d˜ φ =( φ
w − φ
s)f(Q) ≤ 0.
The direct (substitution) eﬀects are reinforced by the indirect (wealth)
eﬀects in one case and counteracted in two cases. First, a rise in bn has a direct
negative eﬀect on R, reducing the propensity to search, as well as a reinforcing
eﬀect via wealth changes; the value of nonemployment increases more than
the value of employment, ∂ (Me − Mo)/∂bn < 0.S e c o n d ,ar i s ei nbs has a
direct negative eﬀect on Q that tend to increase sick leave. In addition, there
is a positive eﬀect on Q via the wealth eﬀects since ∂ (Me − Mo)/∂bs > 0;
higher sickpay raises the value of employment relative to nonemployment and
this makes the worker less inclined to report sick when absence is associated
with an excess layoﬀ risk. The third case pertains to unemployment beneﬁts
that have a direct positive eﬀect on R, making the worker more prone to
search. There is in addition also an indirect negative eﬀect caused by the fact
that the value of employment falls relative to the value of nonemployment,
i.e., ∂ (Me − Mo)/∂bu < 0. The calculations reveal that the sign-predictions
are unambiguous even in the two cases with conﬂicting direct and indirect
eﬀects. The direct eﬀects dominate the indirect eﬀects.10
9To understand expressions (21) — (23), it is useful to look at the eﬀects on Me and
Mo separately. For example, the eﬀect on Me of higher sickness beneﬁts is given by
∂Me/∂bs =[ 1− F(Q)](1/r)
h
(˜ α + r)/
³
˜ α + ˜ φ + r
´i
. In the limiting case when employ-
ment is an absorbing state (˜ φ approaches zero) we have ∂Me/∂bs =[ 1− F(Q)]/r,w h i c h
is the present value eﬀect of higher sickness beneﬁts when there is no risk of job loss.
10As is clear from (18) and (19), unambiguous sign-predictions require (φ
s −
φ
w)(∂Me/∂bs − ∂Mo/∂bs) < 1 and (αu − αn)(∂Me/∂bu − ∂Mo/∂bu) > −1.T h e s e i n -
equalities are satisﬁed.
20Table 1. Eﬀects of non-work beneﬁts on reservation sickness, hirings
and ﬁrings.
RQ˜ α ˜ φ
bs + − ++ ( 0 )
bu + −(0) + +(0)
bn −− (0) − +(0)
bu = bn −− (0) − +(0)
Note: Zeros in parentheses correspond to the case where φ
w= φ
s. T h el a s tl i n es h o w s
the eﬀects of a rise in both types of nonemployment beneﬁts.
Higher sick-pay for employed workers increases R,t h u sm a k i n gn o n e m -
ployed workers less inclined to report sick and more inclined to search as
unemployed. The eﬀect is analogous to the “entitlement eﬀect” discussed in
the literature on unemployment insurance.11 Higher sick-pay for employees
increases the value of employment relative to nonemployment, thus making
the nonemployed worker more prone to choose active search as unemployed
since unemployment serves as an entry port to employment.
Higher unemployment beneﬁts or sickness assistance will reduce Q,i m -
plying a higher probability of sickness reporting, provided that sick leave
carries an excess ﬁring risk. The intuition is not diﬃcult: higher nonemploy-
ment beneﬁts make nonemployment relatively more attractive and weakens
the incentive to prevent a job loss by being present at work.
The ﬁnal row in Table 1 shows the eﬀects of a simultaneous increase in
unemployment beneﬁts and sickness assistance. The eﬀect on Q is obvious
given the earlier results. The eﬀect on R is less obvious given that ∂R/∂bu >
0 whereas ∂R/∂bn < 0. However, the net eﬀect of simultaneous beneﬁt
increases is negative. This follows from the fact that higher nonemployment
beneﬁts lead to a fall in the present value diﬀerence between employment and
nonemployment, i.e., Me − Mo. As is obvious from (9), the direct eﬀect on
R of a general increase in nonemployment beneﬁts is zero so the total eﬀect
is entirely driven by the indirect wealth eﬀect.
Summarizing the results in words, we have:
11The seminal paper is Mortensen (1977).
21Proposition 1 (i) Higher sickness beneﬁts will increase the probability of
reporting sick if the worker is employed and reduce the probability of sick re-
porting if the worker is nonemployed. (ii) Higher unemployment beneﬁts will
reduce the nonemployed worker’s probability of reporting sick. (iii) Higher
sickness assistance, as well as a uniform increase in unemployment beneﬁts
and sickness assistance, will increase the nonemployed worker’s probability of
reporting sick. (iv) Higher unemployment beneﬁts as well as higher sickness
assistance will increase the employed worker’s probability of reporting sick if
φ
s >φ
w;t h e r ew i l lb en oe ﬀect if φ
s = φ
w.
Proof Diﬀerentiate eqs. (8) and (9) while recognizing eqs. (21) -(23)
and the facts that ˜ α = F(R)αu +( 1− F(R)αn is increasing in R and ˜ φ =
F(Q)φ
w +( 1− F(Q))φ
s is non-increasing in Q.
3.4.3 Flow Equilibrium
The individual worker’s choice of reservation sickness aﬀects the transition
rates between the four labor market states and the expected fractions of time
spent in those states. We now take a step towards an aggregate analysis by
considering the ﬂow equilibrium of a labor market with a large number of
individuals. The equations for the ﬂow equilibrium are given in Appendix A.
The solutions — including total employment, e = w +s, the sickness absence
rate, sr = s/e and the unemployment rate, ur = u/(u+e) —a r eg i v e nb ye q s .
(24)-(30). Note that e can be interpreted as the unconditional probability
that an individual is employed as well as the expected proportion of employed
individuals. Analogous interpretations hold for the other states. The eﬀects
of non-work beneﬁts operate through the two reservation sickness variables,
Q and R, where these variables aﬀect total employment via hirings and ﬁrings
since ˜ α =˜ α(R) and ˜ φ = ˜ φ(Q).
22e =˜ α/
³





˜ α + ˜ φ
´
= F(Q)e (25)
s =˜ α[1 − F(Q)]/
³
˜ α + ˜ φ
´
=[ 1− F(Q)]e (26)
u = ˜ φF(R)/
³
˜ α + ˜ φ
´
= F(R)(1 − e) (27)
n = ˜ φ[1 − F(R)]/
³
˜ α + ˜ φ
´










r =1 − F(Q) (30)
It is useful to begin by considering the eﬀects of changes in Q and R,
remembering that a rise in either of these variables implies a rise in labor
market activity, either as work or as search. Note that Q and R in general
aﬀect the magnitude of all stocks. However, the sickness absence rate depends
on Q but is independent of R. The unemployment rate, as conventionally
measured, depends on both R and Q but reduces to ur = φ/(φ + αu) in the
special case where φ
s = φ
w = φ and αn =0 .
By diﬀerentiating eqs. (24)-(30) with respect to Q and R we get the
signs as given by the top panel in Table 2. Results for the special case
with state-independent ﬁring risks, φ
w = φ
s, are given in parentheses. A
rise in Q obviously increases the number of people at work but will also
increase total employment and reduce unemployment provided that absence
entails an excess ﬁring risk; a higher Q implies less outﬂow from employment
to unemployment. A rise in R increases total employment as well as its
components work and sick-leave. This positive employment eﬀect is driven
b yt h ef a c tt h a tar i s ei nR is equivalent to a rise in search eﬀort on the
extensive margin.
Three signs in the two top rows of Table 2 may not be immediately obvi-
ous by simple inspection of Table 1 and the relevant equations for the state
probabilities. A rise in Q reduces the absence rate but increases total employ-
ment through a lower ﬁring rate. It is straightforward to verify that the net
23impact on the number of sick absentees is negative; the direct eﬀect via the
absence rate dominates the indirect eﬀect via the ﬁring rate. Analogously, a
rise in R increases the fraction of searching nonemployed workers but reduces
nonemployment (increases employment) via a higher hiring rate. The net im-
pact on the number of unemployed (and the unemployment rate) is positive
so the direct eﬀect via the fraction of searching nonemployed dominates the
partly oﬀsetting eﬀect via the hiring rate.
Table 2. Labor force eﬀects of non-work beneﬁts.
ew sun u r sr
Q +(0) + − −(0) −(0) −(0) −
R + + + + − + 0
bs ?(+) ?[−] ?(+) + ?(−) + +
bu ?(+) ?(+) ?(+) + ?(−) + +(0)
bn − − ?(−) ?(−) + ?(−) +(0)
bu = bn − − ?(−) ?(−) + ?(−) +(0)
Note: The ﬁrst two lines show the eﬀects of changes in Q and R, the remaining lines
the eﬀects of changes in beneﬁts that work via Q and R. Signs in parentheses correspond
to the special case φ
s= φ
w. The sign in the squared brackets is “plausible”; see Appendix
B.
The lower panel of Table 2 shows how the three types of non-work beneﬁts
aﬀect the size of the labor force categories. From eqs. (24)-(30), it is clear
that one can view the eﬀects on w, s, u,a n dn as the net result of two
factors, viz. how total employment (nonemployment) is aﬀected, and how
employed (nonemployed) workers are allocated between work and sick leave
(unemployment and nonparticipation). We know that some policies, such as
increases in sickness or unemployment beneﬁts, in general tend to raise both
hirings and ﬁrings; cf. Table 1. Since changes in employment are driven
by changes in hirings and ﬁrings, it follows that sickness and unemployment
beneﬁts have generally ambiguous eﬀects on total employment. However,
only the hiring eﬀect remains if strict employment protection legislation rules
out absence-dependent ﬁring risk; the eﬀect on total employment is then
24positive. Higher sickness assistance to nonparticipants, or a uniform rise in
nonemployment beneﬁts, tend to reduce hirings (less incentive to search) and
increase ﬁrings (less costly to be absent); the resulting eﬀect on employment
is unambiguously negative.
Sickness beneﬁts as well as unemployment beneﬁts have also generally
ambiguous eﬀects on the number of individuals at work. A higher fraction
of the employed prefers sick leave; the sickness absence rate increases. Since
the employment eﬀect is ambiguous except in a special case, it is not clear
whether the total number of individuals at work will increase or decrease.
This ambiguity is somewhat surprising but it can be ruled out as implausible;
see Appendix B for details.
Higher sickness beneﬁts produce unambiguous increases in the number of
unemployed individuals and also in the unemployment rate. This is the net
result of three forces, namely (i) a rise in the fraction of nonemployed, F(R),
that pursue active search (higher R), (ii) a fall in the number of nonemployed,
1 − e, because of a rise in the hiring rate (higher ˜ α via higher R), and (iii)
ar i s ei nn o n e m p l o y m e n td u et oar i s ei nﬁrings (higher ˜ φ via lower Q). The
n e ti m p a c to ft h eﬁrst two eﬀe c t si sp o s i t i v e( ∂u/∂R > 0), which guarantees
a positive sign even if absence carries no excess ﬁring risk. Unemployment
will also increase as a response to higher unemployment beneﬁts; the forces
a r ee s s e n t i a l l yt h es a m ea st h o s em e n t i o n e da b o v e .
Higher sickness assistance to nonparticipants, as well as a uniform rise in
unemployment beneﬁts and sickness assistance, have unambiguously negative
eﬀects on the number of employees at work as well as total employment.
Higher sickness assistance reduces the hiring rate (lower R) and increases
the ﬁring rate (lower Q). Nonparticipation increases whereas the eﬀects on
the number of unemployed and the unemployment rate are ambiguous except
in special cases. When the ﬁring risk is independent of absence status, it is
only the negative hiring eﬀect (via lower R) that operates and unemployment
falls.
Proposition 2 summarizes the results in words. Note that the eﬀects on
the sickness absence rate is already given by proposition 1.
25Proposition 2 General case, φ
s ≥ φ
w.
(i) Higher sickness or unemployment beneﬁts will increase the number of un-
employed and the unemployment rate. (ii) Higher sickness assistance, as well
as a uniform rise in unemployment beneﬁts and sickness assistance, reduces





(iii) Higher sickness or unemployment beneﬁts will increase total employ-
ment and the number of sickness absentees, whereas nonparticipation falls.
(iv) Higher sickness assistance, as well as a uniform increase in unemploy-
ment beneﬁts and sickness assistance, reduces the number of people on sick
leave, the number of unemployed individuals and the unemployment rate. (v)
Higher unemployment beneﬁts will increase the number of employees at work.
Proof Diﬀerentiate eqs. (24)-(30) while recognizing eqs. (8), (9) and
( 2 1 ) - ( 2 3 )a sw e l la st h ef a c t st h a t˜ α = F(R)αu +( 1− F(R)αn is increasing
in R and ˜ φ = F(Q)φ
w +( 1− F(Q))φ
s is non-increasing in Q.
This concludes the positive analysis and we turn to the welfare economics
of social insurance beneﬁts.
4W e l f a r e A n a l y s i s
4.1 Objective Function and Budget Restriction
To analyze the problem of choosing non-work beneﬁts in a socially optimal
fashion we need to specify the social welfare function as well as the mode of
beneﬁt ﬁnancing. The general form of the social welfare function is taken to
be utilitarian:
Ω = erM
e +( 1− e)rM
o (31)
where rMe and rMo are given by (14) and (15) above. To slightly sim-
plify matters, and to allow comparisons of steady states without consider-
ing adjustment paths, we let the discount rate approach zero and obtain
26rMe = rMo = rM. The relevant objective function is thus Ω = rM,w h i c h
also can be written as a weighted average of per-period expected utilities:12
Ω = e˜ υ
e +( 1− e)˜ υ
o (32)
We assume that beneﬁts are ﬁnanced by proportional taxation and take
the after-tax replacement rates as the key policy variables. The government’s








g(1 − t) (33)
where Y g is gross labor income, i.e., Y = Y g(1 − t) and ρj the replacement









where t0 is the eﬀective tax rate on individuals at work.
Recall that bj =l nBj and thus bj =l nρjY g(1−t)=l nρj +yg+ln(1−t),
where yg =l nY g. It follows that the tax rate has no eﬀect on the reservation
values of sickness when employed or nonemployed. Cf. eqs. (8) and (9) and
note that the direct utility diﬀerences, y−bs and bu−bn, are independent of
the tax rate. Moreover, the indirect eﬀects operating via the present value
diﬀerence Me −Mo are also zero. This is obvious from the fact that the tax
rate is uniform across the four states. This feature of the model is deliberately
chosen so as to make balanced-budget analysis more tractable.13
With these assumptions we can write the social welfare function as




n)] + e(Q,R)ˆ υ
e (Q;ρ





12To see this, use (14) and (15) to obtain Me−Mo =( ˜ υe − ˜ υo)/(r+˜ α+˜ φ). Substitute
into the expressions for rMe and rMo and assume r → 0.
13Note that the chosen assumptions imply that sickness absence as well as unemployment
will be independent of the level of the real wage. This is arguably an attractive feature in
light of the trend rise in real wages without marked trends in unemployment and absence
rates.
27where ˆ υ
e(·) ≡ ˜ υe(·) − ln(1 − t) and ˆ υ
o(·) ≡ ˜ υo(·) − ln(1 − t) are per-period
expected utilities as given by eqs. (16) and (17) except for the fact that
net income (y) is replaced by gross income (yg). The ﬁrst term on the
right-hand side captures the ﬁscal externality present in the economy. When
individuals make decisions on absence or search, they do not internalize the
eﬀect on taxes. Changes in Q and R have no ﬁrst-order eﬀect on social welfare
except for the impact on the tax rate. The envelope theorem implies that
the welfare function is invariant to derivative changes of Q and R when these
cut-oﬀ values are optimally chosen and the tax rate is constant. This also
implies that changes in employment have no direct eﬀect on social welfare as
long as the tax rate is ﬁxed. Social welfare would rise if individuals could be
made slightly more willing to work and to search, respectively.14
4.2 Welfare Maximization









where ρj (∂Ω/∂ρj)=∂Ω/∂bj.T h eﬁrst term captures the positive welfare ef-
fect from higher beneﬁts, holding taxes constant. The second term represents
t h en e g a t i v ee ﬀect arising from the need to ﬁnance higher beneﬁts by higher
taxes. We have ∂Ω/∂ρs = e[1 − F(Q)] = s, ∂Ω/∂ρu =( 1−e)F(R)=u,a n d
∂Ω/∂ρn =( 1− e)[1− F(R)] = n.M o r e o v e r ,dΩ/dt0 = −1/(1 + t0) and the











where ∂t0/∂ρj is the direct tax eﬀect, absent any behavioral responses from
changes in beneﬁts. From (34) it is clear that this eﬀect is given by s/w for
j = w, u/w for j = u and n/w for j = n. The remaining terms in (37)
14This argument holds only locally, hence the qualiﬁcation ‘slightly’. A small change in
Q or R has no direct eﬀect on welfare, by the envelope theorem.
28capture the behavioral responses to beneﬁt changes. It is assumed that the
second-order conditions for an interior solution are satisﬁed.
4.2.1 Is BeneﬁtD i ﬀerentiation Optimal?
The question that we wish to shed light on is whether there is a case for
beneﬁtd i ﬀe r e n t i a t i o na c r o s st h et h r e es t a t e so fn o n - w o r k .T h e r ei sag e n e r a l
presumption that such diﬀerentiation may be optimal since the behavioral
responses to beneﬁt changes diﬀer across the states of interest. However, it
is not clear whether something speciﬁc can be said about the optimal beneﬁt
structure without adding additional information on the key parameters.
We focus on two cases corresponding to diﬀerent assumptions about the
feasibility of monitoring job search. If monitoring is impossible, it is also
impossible to diﬀerentiate beneﬁts between workers who search and those
who don’t. The second case presupposes that monitoring is feasible so that
beneﬁtd i ﬀerentiation between unemployed job searchers and nonparticipants
is possible.
Sickness Beneﬁts versus Nonemployment Beneﬁts. Let ρo = ρu = ρn
represent nonemployment beneﬁts and o ≡ u + n =1− e total nonemploy-
ment. The ﬁrst-order conditions are then:
dΩ



























To determine whether beneﬁtd i ﬀerentiation is optimal we assume that
(39) holds and check whether ( 3 8 )h o l d sa sa ne q u a l i t yf o rρs = ρo. Substitute

















A uniform beneﬁt structure is not optimal if the derivative given by (40) is
non-zero. If the derivative is positive, sickness beneﬁts should be increased
29so as to achieve ρs >ρ o; if it is negative, sickness beneﬁts should be reduced
to obtain ρs <ρ o.
The ﬁrst term in the brackets is the ratio between the marginal social util-
ities of increasing sickness and nonemployment beneﬁts, respectively. The
higher sickness is relative to nonemployment, the higher the value of rais-
ing sickness beneﬁts relative to nonemployment beneﬁts. The second term





o − dlnw/dlnρo (41)
Absent moral hazard we have dlnw/dlnρj =0and it is straightforward
to verify that the optimal policy involves uniform beneﬁts and full insurance,
i.e., ρs = ρo =1 . The optimal policy with moral hazard takes the eﬀects on
the tax base into account. The larger the relative tax cost of higher sickness
beneﬁts, the more likely that expression (40) is negative and that sickness
beneﬁts should be set lower than nonemployment beneﬁts. We assume that
the problem is well-behaved so that the tax base is decreasing in ρs as well
as ρo.15
After further simpliﬁcations we state the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Sickness beneﬁts should be set higher than nonemployment













Proof Use (38) and (39) to derive (40) and simplify.
T h ec a s ef o rb e n e ﬁtd i ﬀe r e n t i a t i o nt h u sh i n g e so nw h e t h e rt h eg r o u p so f
interest, sickness absentees and nonemployed, diﬀer in size and/or whether
the elasticities of the tax base diﬀer between beneﬁts types. Focusing on the
case with φ
w = φ
s,w ec o m p u t edlnw/dlnρs and dlnw/dlnρo and obtain



















where it is assumed that f(Q) ≈ f(R). Although the sign is generally am-
biguous, it is negative for realistic values for sickness absence rates. Note
that F(Q)(1− F(Q)) − F(R)2 < 0 is a suﬃcient condition that should eas-
ily hold.16 In this case, therefore, sickness beneﬁts should be lower than
nonemployment beneﬁts.
Unemployment Beneﬁts versus Sickness Assistance. We proceed to
examine whether there is a case for beneﬁtd i ﬀerentiation between unem-
ployed individuals and the nonparticipants. The ﬁrst-order conditions for ρu
and ρn are:
dΩ































No assumption concerning ρs is made; ρs may or may not be optimally de-
termined. Since active search boosts job ﬁnding, there is a presumption that
unemployment beneﬁts should be higher than sickness assistance. However,
this outcome is not immediately obvious in the model; note, for example,
that the optimal solution generally depends on ρs as well as on how sickness
absence among employees responds to nonemployment beneﬁts.
To examine whether the presumption is valid we need to resort to a formal
analysis. The following proposition can be established:
Proposition 4 The optimal beneﬁts y s t e mi n v o l v e sρu >ρ n provided that
monitoring of job search is feasible.
16Observed sickness absence rates are lower than 0.10 so F(Q)(1− F(Q)) should be
lower than 0.0˙ 9. In this case the fraction of searchers among the nonemployed, i.e., F(R),
can be as low as 0.3 without violating the suﬃcient condition.
31Proof (Sketch; see Appendix C for details). Assume that (44) holds for
ρu = ρn and check whether (43) also holds as an equality for uniform beneﬁts.















which is unambiguously positive since dR/dρu > 0 and dR/dρn < 0.
The simple intuition for this result is that the nonemployed individual
ignores the fact that search is associated with a positive ﬁscal externality: ad-
ditional search implies additional hirings and ultimately a rise in employment
and the tax base. Unemployment beneﬁts should be set higher than sickness
assistance in order to correct for this externality. The problem is more in-
volved than what the simple intuition conveys, however. It is noteworthy
that conditions pertaining to employees, such as ρs and the responsiveness of
sickness absence to nonemployment beneﬁts, d(s/w)/dρu and d(s/w)/dρn,d o
not aﬀect the qualitative outcome. It also turns out that the eﬀects operating
via Q on u/w and n/w cancel exactly. See Appendix C for details.
5 Concluding Remarks
The paper has proposed a tractable framework for analyzing sickness absence
a n du n e m p l o y m e n ti nau n i ﬁed fashion and applied it to an analysis of social
insurance policies. The analysis identiﬁes channels whereby insurance bene-
ﬁts aﬀect worker ﬂows across labor force states and the implied steady-state
allocation of workers across these states. A number of predictions emerge
from the positive analysis, some less obvious than others. It is unsurprising
that higher unemployment beneﬁts will cause higher unemployment but less
expected that higher sickness beneﬁts for employees will have the same qual-
itative eﬀect. The analysis also predicts that higher unemployment beneﬁts
will generally increase the sickness absence rate among employees. More-
over, it is noteworthy that higher unemployment beneﬁts as well as higher
sickness beneﬁts will increase total employment when stringent employment
32protection legislation makes it impossible to punish absent workers by means
of higher ﬁring risks.
The most clear-cut result from the normative analysis is that unemploy-
ment beneﬁts should be set higher than sickness assistance so as to foster
active job search. This requires that monitoring of job search is feasible, of
course. Existing unemployment insurance schemes involve some degree of
monitoring, a fact that indicates that the optimal policy may be feasible to
implement in practice. Real-world social insurance schemes often lack ﬁnan-
cial penalties associated with sick reporting among unemployed individuals,
a feature at odds with our result.
The normative analysis is more ambiguous concerning the rationale for
beneﬁtd i ﬀerentiation between employed and nonemployed workers. Al-
though real-world schemes often provide higher beneﬁts to employed sick
absentees than to nonemployed individuals reporting sick, there is nothing
in our formal analysis suggesting that this should be optimal. This may
perhaps reﬂect that the model ignores important elements of real-world sick-
ness insurance schemes, such as monitoring of health by insurance providers
and/or ﬁrms.17
The framework can be extended in various directions. It would, for ex-
ample, be straightforward to introduce decision-making along the intensive
margins. One might also consider an extension with endogenous wage deter-
m i n a t i o na n dw i t ha ne x p l i c i tr o l ef o rﬁrms in the decisions on hirings and
ﬁrings. Finally, one would in a more complete normative analysis of sickness
insurance allow for some degree of monitoring of health. Medical certiﬁca-
tion plays a role in real-world sickness insurance schemes although it does
not eliminate all private information about health conditions.
17To exemplify, a Finnish or German employee must contact a medical doctor within
the ﬁrst three days of a sickness spell.
33Appendix A: Flow Equilibrium
The equations for the ﬂow equilibrium are:
φ
ww +( 1− φ
w)[1− F(Q)]w = F(Q)(α
uu + α
nn + s − φ
ss)
φ
ss +( 1− φ
s)F(Q)s =[ 1 − F(Q)](α
uu + α
nn + w − φ
ww)
α
uu +( 1− α
u)[1− F(R)]u = F(R)(φ
ww + φ
ss + n − α
nn)
w + u + s + n =1
The ﬁrst equation equalizes outﬂows from and inﬂows to work (w), the
second correspond to sick absence (s), the third to unemployment (u)a n d
the ﬁnal expression determines nonparticipation (n)r e s i d u a l l yf r o mt h ep o p -
ulation identity. The solution of this system is given in the text.
Appendix B: Sickness Beneﬁts and Sickness Absence
Sickness beneﬁts have ambiguous eﬀects on the number of individuals at












where dlnF(Q)/dbs = −f(Q)/(a−1)F(Q) < 0 and the second term captures





w and compute the eﬀect on the hiring rate:
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2 (1 − e)[1− F(Q)]F(Q)f(R)/f(Q)}
34Consider two cases: (i) if F(θ) is uniform we have f(R)=f(Q); (ii) if
F(θ) is exponential it is true that f(R)/f(Q)=[ 1− F(R)]/[1 − F(Q)].I n
either case the expression can safely be taken as negative for realistic values
of employment and sickness absence rates.18 The sign-prediction would be
further corroborated if ﬁring risks were absence-dependent, i.e., φ
s >φ
w.
Appendix C: Diﬀerentiated Nonemployment Beneﬁts
We are interested in whether the objective function is increasing in ρu when
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The ﬁrst term in the squared brackets captures how changes in ρn and































and by making use of the derivative expressions for d(o/w)/dρu and d(o/w)/dρn
we obtain the condition stated in proposition 4 (note that d(o/w)/dρn > 0).
18Note that
£
F(R)2 − (1 − e)(1 − F(Q))F(Q)
¤
> 0 is a suﬃcient condition for a negative
sign in the ﬁrst case whereas
£
F(R)2 − (1 − e)(1 − F(R))F(Q)
¤
> 0 is suﬃcient in the
second case.
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